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16 July 2020 feels like Groundhog Day in Brussels. For those, who did not see the
famous film Groundhog Day, it’s about reliving the same experience again and again
until the main protagonist gets ‘why’. Similarly, the much anticipated Schrems II
decision, delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) today, is
almost a ‘reliving’ of its earlier decision in Schrems I: today the CJEU invalidated the
(in)famous Privacy Shield Decision (‘Privacy Shield’), succeeded its predecessor
Safe Harbour Decision (‘Safe Harbour’), which the same Court declared invalid back
in 2015 in Schrems I. The Court also upheld the validity of the SCC Decision and
the use of standard contractual clauses for international data transfers, ruling that
National Data Protection Authorities (‘DPAs’) must act where these clauses do not
provide safeguards equivalent to the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’).
Schrems II thus is the latest chapter in the continued ideological battle initiated by
the ‘CJEU’ against the ever-expanding US tech surveillance infrastructure — a tussle
which shows no signs of abating. How many ‘Schrems’ are we going to have — and
who is the protagonist that needs to get ‘why’? Let’s look at it all in more detail. 
Background
Schrems II is the second decision stemming from the long running challenge of
Facebook Ireland’s transfers of personal data to the US by data protection and
privacy activist Maximillian Schrems. Following the Snowden revelations about US
mass surveillance programmes in 2013, Schrems lodged a complaint with the Irish
Data Protection Commissioner (‘DPC’) about Facebook Ireland’s transfer of data
to the US under the Safe Harbour Decision (‘Safe Harbour’), as US surveillance
meant his data was not afforded EU equivalent protections. Safe Harbour was
a European Commission decision declaring the adequacy of protections under
an EU-US arrangement where US data importers could ‘self-certify’ that they
provided EU equivalent data protection. In 2013, the Irish DPC rejected Schrems’
complaint, which he subsequently took to the High Court of Ireland, which referred
two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’). In that
reference for preliminary ruling — now widely known as Schrems I — Schrems
v Data Protection Commissioner the CJEU invalidated Safe Harbour  which had
authorised personal data transfers from the EU to US since 2000 (Schrems I
[98], [104]-[106]), finding transfers made under Safe Harbour were not afforded
essentially equivalent protection to that guaranteed under EU law. The CJEU
returned Schrems’ complaint to the DPC after determining, in line with Commission
v Hungary [53] that DPAs are the ‘guardians’ of fundamental rights, and must be
able to examine claims concerning the protection of rights and freedoms for data
transferred to a third country.
In 2016, shortly after Shrems I, Safe Harbour was replaced with Privacy Shield
which established another US ‘self-certified’ regime for EU-US data transfers, albeit
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within a more restricted framework than Safe Harbour. The DPC re-opened its
investigation, requesting Mr Schrems to reformulate his original complaint in light
of the invalidation of Safe Harbour. That reformulation challenged Facebook’s data
transfers outside of the EU based on SCC’s. Privacy Shield was not in place at the
time Schrems reformulated complaint was lodged (Schrems II [151,-[153]). SCC
are contractual clauses, agreed between the data exporter (i.e. Facebook Ireland)
and data importer, (i.e. Facebook US) used by data controllers to assure essentially
equivalent data protection in a third country. Schrems’ claimed the reliance on SCCs
could not be valid due to US local obligations to provide access to personal data to
public authorities under US surveillance programs, thus failing to ensure adequate
protection for data transferred outside the EU.
Based on Schrems’ new complaint, the DPC raised a number of questions before
the High Court of Ireland, which subsequently referred 11 questions to the CJEU
in Schrems II. These questions turned the focus towards the suitability and validity
of SCCs and by inference, the validity of Privacy Shield. Schrems II presented
the CJEU with another opportunity to articulate data protection requirements for
international data transfers, in what has turned out to be Groundhog Day for EU-US
adequacy decisions.  
CJEU Decision
The CJEU first held that although the complaint was brought under the EU Data
Protection Directive, which has since been repealed, the questions would be
answered under the GDPR [79]. The Court affirmed that the GDPR applies to
the transfer of data to a third country for processing for a commercial purpose
[86], irrespective of further processing by public authorities for national security
purposes [89]. Determining that SCCs can be validly used [105], the CJEU outlined
that an assessment of the level of protection afforded under SCCs should include
the agreed contractual clauses between the data controller and the third country
recipient/processor, any access by public authorities to the data and the legal system
of the third country [105] with the thresholds required outlined under Chapter V of
the GDPR [93]. The responsibility to suspend, limit, or even ban international data
transfers where they do not provide the ‘essential equivalent’ of EU law, was again
thrust upon DPAs, particularly where they formed the view that SCCs are not or
cannot be complied with in the third country [113], [121]. This obligation to act is
tempered only by the presence of an adequacy decision such as Privacy Shield,
validating transfers to the third country.  In those circumstances, the Court explained,
the DPA must be able to investigate a complaint, and where the investigation reveals
doubts about the safeguards provided, they should bring the matter before then
national courts who may then refer the matter for a preliminary ruling on the validity
of the adequacy decision [120], [157]. Data controllers still have an obligation to act
first: where they are exporting data and there is a conflict between the SCC and local
laws, the data controller should suspend data flows [134]-[135].  In situations where
Member States’ DPAs adopt diverging decisions about the adequacy of safeguards
in third countries, the CJEU highlighted that the matter should be referred to the
European Data Protection Board for an opinion [147]. SCCs were found to be a valid
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mechanism for ensuring essentially equivalent protections in third countries and as
such the SCC Decision was found to be valid [148]-[149].
In a departure from the A-G Opinion, the Court chose to engage with the validity of
Privacy Shield and declared it invalid [199]. In essence, this is because of the Court’s
findings that DPAs cannot act against an adequacy decision, such as Privacy Shield,
without raising the validity of the decision with their national courts, who may, if they
agree with the DPA, request a preliminary ruling by the CJEU.  In other words, the
Irish DPC would have been prohibited from stopping, limiting or prohibiting data
flows based on Schrems’ complaint if Privacy Shield remained valid.  On this matter
the Court specifically said ‘Privacy Shield decision is binding on the supervisory
authorities insofar as it finds that the United States ensures an adequate level of
protection’ [156].
The Court engaged in an assessment of the adequacy assured by the United
States [178]-[198].  In short, the Court affirmed concerns over US surveillance laws
including section 702 of the FISA and Executive Order 12333 [178], ultimately finding
that neither, when read in conjunction with Presidential Policy Directive PPD-28
‘correlates to the minimum safeguards resulting, under EU law, the principle of
proportionality, with the consequence that the surveillance programs based on those
provisions cannot be regarded as limited to what is strictly necessary’ [184].  The
 Privacy Shield decision determined that the US provides essentially equivalent
safeguards, yet, the Court found US surveillance laws were not sufficiently
circumscribed to meet that threshold[185].  Further, the Court assessed the right
to redress under the ombudsperson regime was deficient with at least some
mechanisms of surveillance not covered [191], [192].  Finally, it was criticized
that the ombudsperson was not independent from the executive [195]. The Court
concluded that for these reasons the Privacy Shield decision was invalid due to
incompatibility with Article 45(1) of the GDPR [199].
Was the Invalidation of Privacy Shield Expected?
Schrems II was the second EU-US decision on adequacy invalidated in a period
shorter than five years. With over 5000 companies certified under Privacy Shield,
similar numbers to those certified under Safe Harbour, the invalidation of Privacy
Shield will have significant implications for data transfers to the US.
With findings of the Irish High Court that the US carries out mass and indiscriminate
data processing risking violation of Arts 7 and 8 of the Charter [193], the invalidation
of Privacy Shield was not unexpected.  Comments in the Schrems II AG Opinion on
Privacy Shield’s validity [340], [341] supported the overall CJEU finding that data
transfers can only be made where the third country provides essentially equivalent
EU law protection. The invalidation again questions the ability of a ‘self-certified’
agreement, such as Privacy Shield, to maintain EU levels of protection where local
laws have an extensive surveillance focus.
The political climate in the EU surrounding Privacy Shield was also negative. The
European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee has repeatedly recommended that
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the Privacy Shield was inadequate and the EP has called on the EU Commission
to review the scheme . The 2017 amendments to the US Foreign and Intelligence
Surveillance Act, extending the controversial surveillance scheme raised concerns
at the European Parliament , and the failure to roll out the Protecting the Privacy
of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services Act in 2017,
fuelled the criticism of the federal US data protection regime. The Cambridge
Analytica scandal has further highlighted that if Privacy Shield was to be maintained,
it required better monitoring. Finally, the highly contentious 2017 CLOUD Act which
permit US access to data held by US companies across the globe, have also raised
concerns at the EP. The interplay between EU data protection law, its potential
effects on Privacy Shield and its ability to circumvent existing MLAT (Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty) processes have been questioned. The exact interaction between
the CLOUD Act, Privacy Shield and EU data protection law is unclear.
Implications for SCCs
Schrems II will have significant implications for data transfers to third countries,
including the post-Brexit UK, because SCCs are relied on by 88 per cent of EU
companies transferring data outside the EU. With data controllers being the first
layer of protection under the SCC regime, and specific requirements outlined for
these agreements, including a finding of inadequacy of US laws, it is anticipated that
the next several months will be consumed by data exporters/controllers re-evaluating
current SCCs. In light of the Court’s ruling that DPA’s must act on user complaints
where data transfers under SCCs do not afford equivalent EU law protections, the
pressure will be on data controllers to ensure compliance.
Of course, if SCCs are to be effective mechanisms of EU law, DPAs must be
prepared to use their Schrems II-mandated powers confidently, adopting corrective
measures where data controllers fail to act or make agreements under SCCs which
do not afford protection which is an essential equivalent of EU law.
Conclusion
Following the Snowden revelations in 2013, the CJEU has been very vocal on the
constitutional significance of data protection in EU legal framework well beyond the
Schrems’ saga. Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications, Tele2 Sverige
AB v Postoch telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom
Watson, Opinion 1/15 (Passenger Name Records) and Constantin Film Verleih v
YouTube LLC and Google have demonstrated the CJEU’s persistence in ensuring
EU fundamental rights are protected in a world where surveillance is becoming the
norm, not the exception. 
Schrems II has reinforced the fundamental role of data protection in the EU legal
order and transatlantic relations, demonstrating that it will not accept ‘second rate’
protection for personal data transferred outside EU. It has also reasserted the
DPA’s power to suspend, limit, or even ban data transfers to countries where EU
fundamental rights are not protected. It remains to be seen if DPA’s, in their newly
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affirmed role as the gatekeepers of international data transfers, will wield their
powers and close the gates to data flows where they fall below the standards of the
EU law. One thing is certain, the CJEU’s fight to ensure the role for data protection in
international data flows is not yet over. And we may see another Groundhog Day.
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